A Gas Target Model for the EU: Florence School Proposes MECO-S by GLACHANT, Jean-Michel
POLICYbrief
Highlights1
- The discussion about the need for and the pros and cons of a gas 
target model started around the beginning of 2010 and found its 
first point of culmination in the conclusions of the 18th Madrid 
Forum in September 2010 which invited stakeholders to start a 
process to develop a EU Gas Target Model.
- Florence School of Regulation proposes a European gas target 
model with a special focus on market architectures and invest-
ment: The MECO-S Model. The MECO-S is a “Market Enabling, 
Connecting and Securing” Model describing an end-state of the 
gas market to be achieved over time.
- The common foundation of the MECO-S Model is the economic 
investment. Investment aims at supporting the other pillars in re-
alizing their respective goals e.g. in contributing to the creation of 
functioning markets or in contributing to improved price align-
ment. 
 
1  The author particularly thanks Sergio Ascari (FSR gas adviser), Jacques de Jong and Leo-
nie Meulman (Clingendael International Energy Programme), Albrecht Wagner (Wagner, 
Elbling and Company), Christophe Pouillon (GRT Gaz), Margot London (Eurogas) and 
Stephan Kamphues (ENTSOG). The author, however, underlines that the vision delivered in 
this paper is only his and does not bind or tie any of these persons. Moreover, Sergio Ascari, 
Jacques de Jong and Leonie Meulman, on the other hand, published separately their own 
conclusions. The author also wants to thank the experts of the Austrian and German Na-
tional Regulatory Agencies, notably: Michael Schmöltzer, Markus Krug and Stefanie Neve-
ling. However it is underlined that the vision that is expressed in the MECO-S model is the 
author and not theirs. 
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Gas Target Model: Definition and Objectives
A Gas Target Model (GTM) is a non-binding, top-down 
framework of principles and characteristics that are as broad 
as possible, providing a description of how the market is ex-
pected to develop till 2020. This would serve as a tool for guid-
ing and assessing the on-going process of developing frame-
work guidelines and guidelines that are the foundations of the 
broader Network Codes under the 3rd Energy Market Package. 
In addition, its objective will also be to guide and assess the 
on-going process of the Gas Regional Initiatives. A GTM will 
furthermore have to take due account of the wider energy pol-
icy objectives with regard to sustainability and supply security. 
The 3rd Energy Market Package set into force in 2010 defines a 
number of structural elements towards realizing an architec-
ture for the internal market for gas. The most notable among 
these elements being the mandatory entry/exit organisation of 
TSO network access and the processes that shall lead to a har-
monized system of European TSO network codes.
Now, many different stakeholders at European and national 
level are working on the implementation of the 3rd package. 
These include: lawmakers in the 25 member states with natu-
ral gas; regulators in the 25 member states with natural gas; 
ACER; ENTSOG; the EU Commission; members of comitol-
ogy committees; TSOs, DSOs and their associations; suppliers, 
wholesalers, retailers and traders and their associations.
A challenge for these implementation efforts is that the 3rd En-
ergy Market Package does not include a comprehensive vision 
of the organisation of network access across the European Un-
ion. For instance, the 3rd Energy Market Package does not say 
if every single TSO shall set up its own entry/exit system or if 
the number of entry/exit networks shall be smaller than the 
number of TSOs, if the TSO balancing system shall include 
distribution networks or not, if entry/exit network access shall 
extend from transmission systems down to distribution net-
works or not, etc.
Depending on the answers to these questions certain issues 
might need to be addressed on a European level. For instance 
if the TSO balancing system includes distribution systems, the 
European balancing harmonization has a much wider scope 
(and requires much more detail) then otherwise; also national 
action would be required, obligating DSOs to blend into that 
system. Or if the entry/exit systems shall include distribution 
systems, then action on a national level will be required to deal 
with the corollary cost (and tariff) issues for DSOs (which may 
receive a cost allocation from TSOs in such a system).
The Target Model Coordinating the 3rd Package Im-
plementation
Now the risk is that – within a very limited timescale – a lot 
of policy makers and other stakeholders while doing their best 
to implement the 3rd Energy Market Package – interpret and 
implement the package in a different way or work on different 
strands of implementation that – after having been elaborated 
in great detail – contradict each other. This problem is aggra-
vated by the fact that – inter alia due to resource limitations – 
not all European network codes envisaged at the moment (e.g. 
for capacity allocation management, balancing, interoperabil-
ity, tariffs, etc.) can be developed at the same time.
It is in this potential problem area where a gas target model 
can play a beneficial role by helping to make visions about the 
future of the internal gas market transparent and by enabling 
discussions about unifying those visions. The discussion about 
the need for and the pros and cons of a gas target model started 
around the beginning of 2010 and found its first point of cul-
mination in the conclusions of the 18th Madrid Forum in Sep-
tember 2010 which invited “the Commission and the regulators 
to explore, in close cooperation with system operators and other 
stakeholders, the interaction and interdependence of all relevant 
areas for network codes and to initiate a process establishing a 
gas market target model”. Based on this conclusion CEER start-
ed – by the end of 2010 – the process of developing a gas target 
model for Europe.
The MECO-S Target Model
The Florence School of Regulation proposes a European gas 
target model with a special focus on market architectures and 
investment. It is termed the MECO-S Model. The MECO-S is a 
“Market Enabling, Connecting and Securing” Model describ-
ing an end-state of the gas market to be achieved over time. 
The MECO-S Model rests on three pillars that share a com-
mon foundation, making sure that economical investments in 
pipelines are realized
The MECO-S model aims at the creation of a number of func-
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tioning wholesale markets within the EU (together enabling 
easy access to all European final customers of gas), at con-
necting these markets tightly in order to maximize short- and 
mid-term price alignment between those markets, at enabling 
secure supply patterns to those markets and at making sure 
that all economic investments in gas transmission capacity are 
done.
First Pillar: Wholesale Markets
Pillar 1 shall realize the goal of enabling functioning whole-
sale markets. Such markets are an essential feature of the in-
ternal market since they contribute to efficiency in managing 
gas and gas-related assets such as supply contracts, storage and 
gas-fired power stations. Additionally and no less important-
ly, such markets are an essential basis for retail competition. 
Finally, functioning wholesale markets are a basis for market 
based balancing and market coupling. Without functioning 
markets, both of these concepts could not be harnessed. 
Pillar 1 is realized by structuring Europe into markets that are 
sufficiently sized2 and well connected to sources of gas3  so 
2 i.e. ≥ 20 bcm of final customer consumption
Box 1 - The 3 Pillars of MECO-Target Model
• Pillar 1: Structuring network access to the European gas grid in a way that enables functioning wholesale mar-
kets so that every European final customer is easily accessible from such a market.
• Pillar 2: Fostering short- and mid-term price alignment between the functioning wholesale markets by tightly 
connecting the markets through facilitating cross-market supply and trading and potentially implementing 
market coupling as far as the (at any time) given infrastructure allows. 
• Pillar 3: Enabling the establishment of secure supply patterns to the functioning wholesale markets. 
that the emergence of a competitive traded wholesale market 
is likely. Where necessary with a view to that goal, member 
states have to create cross-border markets in order to increase 
market size and connectivity. 
 
The two models to create cross-border market are based on 
entry/exit systems. Moreover, both models may be used in 
parallel in Europe, whereby the market area model appears at-
tractive for larger member states and the trading region model 
has specific merits for smaller member states that need to co-
operate cross-border in order to gain sufficient market size and 
connectivity.  
3 i.e. at least three different sources of gas 
Box 2 - Two models to create cross -borders markets
• Market Areas, that implement integrated balancing 
zones reaching down to the final customers 
• Trading Regions, that implement integrated whole-
sale markets which are tightly connected to national 
end user zones
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Second Pillar: Allocation of ‘gas-related assets’ in 
European Scale
Pillar 2 aims at maximizing the efficiency of managing gas and 
gas-related assets on a European scale by making sure that the 
existing interconnecting infrastructure is put to the best use. 
The resulting tight connection of markets will lead to price 
alignment between European markets as far as the – at any 
time existing – infrastructure allows. Price alignment virtu-
ally unifies all European markets by enabling cross-portfolio 
optimisation via those markets on a European scale. Measures 
are foreseen so that TSOs do not suffer any loss from price 
alignment. 
Pillar 2 is firstly realized by implementing hub-to-hub trans-
port products and a number of harmonisation measures that 
make inter-market supply and trading significantly easier. The 
allocation of hub-to-hub transport products shall be by auc-
tion for the mid- and short-term markets and by first come 
first serve for the intra-day market.
Secondly it is proposed to implement pilot projects for day-
ahead market coupling to explore if the potential benefits of 
market coupling can be realized in practice for gas. If so, day-
ahead market coupling would become an integral part of the 
MECO-S Model.
Third Pillar: Security of Supply
Pillar 3 aims at enabling secure supply patterns to the Euro-
pean markets. Specifically Pillar 3 creates the preconditions 
for underpinning long-term supply contracts with appropriate 
transport products, taking into consideration that currently 
about 30% of all gas consumed in Europe crosses more than 
one border point. Additionally Pillar 3 aims at providing a 
market based solution for realizing transport security of sup-
ply where collaboration with adjoining markets is required.
Pillar 3 is realized by foreseeing the execution (if demanded 
by shippers) of new long-term transport contracts. These con-
tracts can be requested periodically in an open season style 
process for the full term of interest to the shipper, e.g. 15 years. 
If in the process the demand for long-term capacity proves 
higher than the availability of such capacities, then capacities 
will be expanded by investment if they are economical. In or-
der to allow for such investment, the lead time for allocating 
long-term capacity shall always be at least as long as the time 
required for expanding capacity. Since in this structure capac-
ity can always be expanded, long-term capacity is not a scarce 
good anymore and auctioning of that capacity can be avoided. 
Allocation questions at the fringe of the allocation problem 
can be solved by an optimisation procedure.
In order to deal with shippers interested in long-distance 
transport (e.g. from a European border point to the next but 
one market) link chain products are introduced. Link chain 
products are packages of (hub-to-hub) transport products at 
several border points on a continuous route that may be re-
quested by the shipper as a whole and are allocated at the same 
level of capacity on all requested border points. After alloca-
tion they may be used as separate hub-to-hub capacities. 
In the area of transport security of supply the instrument of 
the fall-back capacity contract is introduced. It provides a 
means for member states to secure that sufficient capacity in 
a neighbouring market is made and kept available in order 
to cater to the security needs of said member states. Under a 
fall-back capacity contract a TSO (A) of the member state in 
need of redundant transport capacity (as defined by a compe-
tent authority) books the required capacity long term with a 
neighbouring TSO (B). TSO B charges TSO A only that part of 
the capacity that is not booked by shippers directly with TSO 
B (hence the name “fall-back contract”). TSO A allocates the 
cost for this security measure to final customers in his market.
MECO-S Model and network investment
As highlighted the common foundation of the MECO-S Mod-
el is economic investment. Investment aims at supporting the 
other pillars in realizing their respective goals e.g. in contrib-
uting to the creation of functioning markets (by new intercon-
nection to these markets) or in contributing to improved price 
alignment between markets (by new/expanded interconnec-
tion between these markets). Several issues are discussed in 
the study regarding investment including the structuring of 
investment appraisal processes, the evaluation of investment 
in interconnection and intraconnection pipelines and the fi-
nancing of investment.
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Box 3: The Key Results of MECO-S on Investment
• Investment appraisal and the allocation of long-term capacity should always (even on existing systems) be an 
integrated process in the style of an open season (see also above under Pillar 3).
• The quantity of capacity that shall be reserved for the mid- and short-term market shall be created (and hence 
invested) on top of any investment required to satisfy (economic) long-term capacity requests.
• The economic appraisal of investment shall take into account the return from long-term contracts as well as the 
value expected to be generated by price alignment due to the capacity reserved for the mid- and short-term 
markets. The cost for mid- and short-term capacities that are not directly recovered by tariffs shall be allocated 
to the beneficiaries. 
• In case TSOs declare that they can/will not invest in an otherwise economic investment project, the project shall 
be tendered to the market. The scope of the tender would be to build and finance the pipeline (or other asset) 
against a yearly fee paid long-term. After construction, the realized project would be integrated into the opera-
tional responsibility of the respective TSO.
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